payoff value
Game-Of-Goals: Using adversarial games to achieve strategic resilience
Our objective in this paper is to develop a machinery that makes a given organizational strategic plan resilient to the actions of competitor agents (adverse environmental actions). We assume that we are given a goal tree representing strategic goals (can also be seen business requirements for a software systems) with the assumption that competitor agents are behaving in a maximally adversarial fashion(opposing actions against our sub goals or goals in general). We use game tree search methods (such as minimax) to select an optimal execution strategy(at a given point in time), such that it can maximize our chances of achieving our (high level) strategic goals. Our machinery helps us determine which path to follow(strategy selection) to achieve the best end outcome. This is done by comparing alternative execution strategies available to us via an evaluation function. Our evaluation function is based on the idea that we want to make our execution plans defensible(future-proof) by selecting execution strategies that make us least vulnerable to adversarial actions by the competitor agents.
- Oceania > Australia > New South Wales > Wollongong (0.04)
- Asia (0.04)
A Gentle Introduction to Jensen's Inequality
It is common in statistics and machine learning to create a linear transform or mapping of a variable. An example is a linear scaling of a feature variable. We have the natural intuition that the mean of the scaled values is the same as the scaled value of the mean raw variable values. Unfortunately, we bring this intuition with us when using nonlinear transformations of variables where this relationship no longer holds. Fixing this intuition involves the discovery of Jensen's Inequality, which provides a standard mathematical tool used in function analysis, probability, and statistics.
Risk Aware Ranking for Top-$k$ Recommendations
Parambath, Shameem A Puthiya, Vijayakumar, Nishant, Chawla, Sanjay
Given an incomplete ratings data over a set of users and items, the preference completion problem aims to estimate a personalized total preference order over a subset of the items. In practical settings, a ranked list of top-$k$ items from the estimated preference order is recommended to the end user in the decreasing order of preference for final consumption. We analyze this model and observe that such a ranking model results in suboptimal performance when the payoff associated with the recommended items is different. We propose a novel and very efficient algorithm for the preference ranking considering the uncertainty regarding the payoffs of the items. Once the preference scores for the users are obtained using any preference learning algorithm, we show that ranking the items using a risk seeking utility function results in the best ranking performance.